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Abstract This paper describes the French initiative in materials research against
both a national and an international background, in an attempt to disentangle the local
circumstances, which prompted this governmental initiative, and to characterize the specific
profile of materials research in France. In presenting a biography of the interdisciplinary
program in materials research (PIRMAT), we argue that: i) the PIRMAT denotes a failure of
the French science policy in materials research; ii) the leadership of the CNRS led to a
specific style of research, quite different from the engineering approach of Materials Science
and Engineering, and characteristic of a French style in materials research.
Keywords Materials science - Engineering – Science policy – National style –
Interdisciplinarity
Materials Science emerged as a new entity embracing all kinds of materials – from
wood, to metals, ceramics, semi-conductors and composites – in many industrialised countries
over the second half of the twentieth century. Such a field of research required
interdisciplinary structures, which were implemented through national science policies. In
France, an interdisciplinary program, the PIRMAT (interdisciplinary program in materials
research) was launched in 1982. Like the US program of interdisciplinary laboratories
initiated in the early 1960s, the PIRMAT resulted both from a combination of the inner
dynamics of a number of scientific communities, and from a political decision. In the French
case, an impulse was given, in 1982, by the newly formed socialist government. However,
unlike the US program which created Materials Science and Engineering (MSE), the French
initiative was rather short-lived, and did not result in the creation of materials science centres
in universities.
Based on institutional archives crossed with oral testimonies, this paper tells the
biography of the short-lived PIRMAT. It describes the French initiative in materials research
against both a national and an international background, in an attempt to disentangle the local
circumstances, which prompted a governmental initiative in the field, and to characterize the
specific profile of materials research in France.
This case study raises a broader historiographical issue: How are we to evaluate the
success or failure of the French program? It is tempting to use its American counterpart as the
standard for success, since Materials science emerged while the USA were supporting the
reconstruction of European research following World War 2, and played a key role in shaping
national science policies (Krige 2006). NATO meetings were organized to spread the US
model in Europe (NATO 1963). Unsurprisingly, issues of national differences came up again
and again over the course of our interviews with materials scientists. From our perspective,
national differences should be accounted for in terms of national styles rather than in terms of
2time lag.1 Thus the French program is evaluated against its own objectives and ambitions, and
we consider international comparisons an integral part of the story.
We stumbled upon the issue of national comparisons from the outset, since different
countries used different names for the topic of our historical inquiry. The very name Materials
Science and Engineering (MSE) was coined in the USA and does not necessarily reflect the
situation in other countries, where materials research did not become institutionalized as a
new hybrid science. As soon as we tried to apply the phrase “materials science and
engineering” to describe the French case, we identified all the obstacles, impediments,
prejudices, conservatisms, which would become the ingredients of a non-success story.
The ambition of this paper is to characterize a French style in materials research. To this
end, we will discuss the following issues: To what extent did the Centre national de la
recherche scientifique (CNRS) create a specific and favourable context for the emergence of
materials science in France? What was the impact of the government, and the input from the
industry? And, finally, is it possible, and is it worth assessing national programs without
resorting to international ranking?
1. The Context
1.1. The Hegemony of the CNRS
The French research agency named CNRS2 was officially created in 1939 to provide
regular incomes for full-time researchers, in all research areas, and to coordinate scientific
research at a national level. It enjoyed such a high-level of autonomy that it was described by
a historian as a “republic of scientists” (Picard 1990). Since 1945, the National committee, in
charge of the CNRS researchers’ recruitment and evaluation, has been structured into
disciplinary sections.
In compliance with the US support to European research in the 1950s and 1960s, the
CNRS policy was mainly oriented toward fundamental research. The US program of support
to European scientific programs was based on a clear-cut distinction between basic research -
that was financially supported - and applied research, which was not encouraged, and even
forbidden for all military applications (Krige 2006). However, no strict control was needed,
since there was a consensus around the linear model, i.e. the view that fundamental research is
a precondition for technological advances (Godin 2006). Thanks to generous funding from the
Rockefeller foundation, and to a significant increase in the French research budget in the
1960s, a number of centres sporting cutting-edge instrumentation quickly acquired
international recognition. In the 1970s, the CNRS encouraged collaborations with industrial
research, and CNRS/industry joint laboratories (laboratoires mixtes) were created. In 1975, a
new department of engineering sciences (SPI for Sciences physiques pour l’ingénieur) was
created, and interdisciplinary research programs (PIR for Programme interdisciplinaire de
recherche) were launched. The first PIR was devoted to solar energy (PIRDES). In addition,
new sources of funding became based on themed invitations to tender such as the
                                                 
1 See, for instance, Cottrel (2000). For a British view, see Cahn (2001). For a critical perspective on the centre-
periphery perspective on materials research, see Bensaude-Vincent and Hessenbruch (2004).
2 More information about the history of the CNRS in Picard (1990), Guthleben (2009), and in La Revue pour
l’Histoire du CNRS, esp. N°1 (1999): "Le CNRS au temps de Charles de Gaulle: 1958-1969", N°2 (2000): "Les
premiers laboratoires du CNRS", N°11 (2004): "Le CNRS au sein du dispositif de recherche français: ses
relations avec d’autres organismes". For a broader view of the organization of the French research system, see
Shinn (1980, 1994).
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3programmed thematic actions (ATP for Actions thématiques programmées) and research
networks (GRECO for Groupements de recherches coordonnées).
In brief, the French national policy followed the general model imposed by the
“American hegemony” on European research in the aftermath of WW2. However, unlike the
USA and the UK, France rebuilt its research potential under the leadership of the CNRS, and
independently of universities. The creation of novel research agencies dedicated to applied
research such as the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in 1945, the National Institute for
Agricultural Research (INRA) in 1946, the National Institute for Medical Research
(INSERM) in 1964, only served to reinforce the CNRS’ dedication to fundamental research in
all areas. Indeed, while universities were also part of the research landscape, they declined
because they were never able to benefit from the high levels of autonomy and funding CNRS
laboratories had (Bourdieu 1984, p. 270). In addition, few engineering schools were able to
conduct cutting-edge research. Thus the CNRS gained a virtual monopoly on French
fundamental research, and an international reputation, as exemplified by a number of Nobel
laureates. Retrospectively, the 1950s and the 1960s are often described as the golden age of
fundamental research in France.
1.2. Strong Academic Communities
In order to fulfil its multidisciplinary ambition, the CNRS was structured along
disciplinary lines, including a few large departments employing increasing numbers of full-
time researchers.3 This disciplinary structure allowed the emergence of many sub-disciplines
within each department. In particular, solid-state physics quickly became established within
the mathematics and physics departments, and solid-state chemistry within the chemistry
department. Interdisciplinary networks also developed in the 1960s and 1970s, thanks to the
institution of summer schools, which, according to its actors, played a key role in the
emergence of a “materials way of thinking”.
In particular, a strong community of solid-state physics developed in two major centres:
Paris and Grenoble. In Grenoble, a centre dedicated to magnetism nucleated around Louis
Néel: The Centre Laue-Langevin, created in 1967 with rich equipment, became a prestigious
research centre for electronics and microelectronics. Néel developed a research school around
semi-conductors, characterized by a close alliance between theoretical and experimental
physics (Pestre 1990).
In Paris, solid-state physics was more a continuation of metallurgy. Between 1959 and
1989, a doctoral program in solid-state physics chaired by Jacques Friedel at Orsay
University, in the South of Paris, provided solid theoretical and experimental training for an
entire generation. Friedel, the heir of a brilliant scientific dynasty, did his PhD with Nevill
Mott in Bristol. Over thirty years, he managed a research school focused on dislocations and
the electronics of solids, which developed sophisticated techniques (ultra-vacuum, in situ
characterization, etc) to investigate bulk materials and surfaces. When Pierre-Gilles de
Gennes joined the group in the 1960s, the research area gradually extended to include the
investigation of liquid crystals and polymers. In the 1970s, the solid-state physics community
turned to less-conventional materials, such as the amorphous disordered states of matter. The
phrase “dirty physics” was often used to refer to this kind of research.
This community was cemented by a series of summer schools in Les Houches, a ski
resort in the French Alps, which proved vital for the reconstruction of research. In the 1960s,
the summer schools brought together metallurgists and physicists, and were also opened to
                                                 
3 From about 350 researchers in 1945 to about 1000 in the 1960s and 10 000 in the 1980s (Guthleben 2009, p.
371).
4industrial researchers and foreign scientists. Over the years, they focused on specific topics
such as “physics of ill-condensed matter” in 1978 and defects in 1980.
Given that most of the topics covered by the solid-state physics communities belong to
materials science, should we describe it as the first step in the emergence of this discipline in
France? The Orsay group certainly did foster continued interactions between physicists and
chemists, and included contacts in industrial companies manufacturing glass, aluminium and
electric cables. Interestingly, most of the actors we interviewed did not feel they had been
working on materials science. They stressed the distance between their academic perspective
and the engineering perspective that prevailed in MSE. For instance, Friedel argued that in
France, materials science did not emerge until a governmental initiative was launched by the
Direction générale de la recherche scientifique et technologique (DGRST) in 1970-71, out of
a “concerted action” between metallurgists and physico-chemists, with a strong slant towards
using an engineering perspective. In other words, the emergence of materials science is
presented as a top-down political decision, rather than a bottom-up process resulting from the
inner dynamics of academic research. This French insiders’ view differs from the self-
representation developed by some of the major actors in the USA – Bernhardt Wuensch and
Mildred Dresselhauss for instance4 - and from the standard narrative published by Robert
Cahn in the UK (Cahn 2001). This contrast may be due to the exclusive focus of French solid-
state physicists on structure-properties relationships, with no attention to performances and
processes.
In parallel to the solid-state physics community, a community of solid-state chemists
emerged. And this seems to be a French peculiarity. While, in the USA, a niche was provided
by MSE for solid-state chemists (DiSalvo 1990), in France, they created a new branch of
chemistry, named “chimie du solide” (Teissier 2007). The community attracted so many
young researchers that it increased from about 100 people in the late forties to over 500, and
40 laboratories, in the mid-1960s. Three different topics prevailed in the 1950s and 1960s:
Solid-state reactions in non-stoichiometric oxides, high temperature chemistry of refractory
materials, and metal oxides. French chemists thus provided refractory ceramics to the nuclear
and space industries, and magnetic oxides as recording materials. In the 1960s, they became
experts in crystal-genesis (required for semi-conductors); they also designed optical rare earth
compounds for TV screen pigments. Later in the 1970s, they focused on ionic
superconductors for the energy and automotive industries. Unlike solid-state physicists, they
went beyond structure-properties relationships, and developed an interest in “property-
performance relationships”, which provided the funding they depended on.
The solid-state chemistry community was a fragmented world, dominated by
charismatic leaders - Robert Collongues in Paris, Paul Hagenmuller in Bordeaux -, with a
kind of tacit agreement between research groups which roughly divided labour based on a
split of the periodic system, thus giving each group their own turf. In addition, the
community, which developed around the topic of mineral chemistry, had virtually no contact
with the physico-chemists who developed surface science or catalysis (Voillequin 2008).
In summary, even before the national initiative on materials was created, a variety of
materials – solids, liquid crystals, semi-conductors, ionic conductors, catalysts and more
exotic powders – had been the subjects of intense research efforts in France. Such research
had developed within distinct disciplinary contexts under the aegis of the CNRS. It was a
state-dependent research mainly pursued by academic scientists. They occasionally
collaborated with industrial research laboratories, but their careers and research pathways did
not depend on industrial funds.
                                                 
4 Interviews of B. Wuensch, Jan. 9, 2001, of M. Dresselhauss, Oct. 25, 2001, and of R. Cahn, Dec. 6, 2000, by B.
Bensaude-Vincent and A. Hessenbruch. See all these interviews on the website http://www.sho.espci.fr/ (under
construction). See also DiSalvo (1990).
51.3. Materials Science as an Objective (1977-81)
In the late 1970s, materials research became a political concern. In 1979-1980, the
DGRST asked Friedel to survey the state of the art in materials science, with a view to
defining the French research strategy for the next ten years. Friedel’s report highlighted a
number of strong points (physico-chemistry of materials and surface science) as well as
weaknesses such as the virtual absence of interaction between the investigation of mechanical
properties of materials and their chemical structures. This report focused on academic
research, although Friedel was a member of the scientific board of the industrial group Saint-
Gobain.
The first impulse toward an interdisciplinary program on materials came from within
the disciplinary structure of the CNRS itself. The “mathematics and physics department” of
the CNRS launched the first call for tenders on materials science in August 1977. The
“materials thematic programmed actions” (“actions thématiques programmées matériaux”)
targeted three classes of materials: Amorphous materials and liquids; interstitial compounds
with great ionic mobility; selective absorption compounds for photo-thermal conversion of
solar energy. Only nine proposals were selected and funded for 18 to 24 months. The total
budget for all three actions came from the CNRS, and was about one million French Francs
(FF), which is approximately equivalent to 500 000 EUR today. Although these calls for
tenders were renewed every year for four years, in 1978 and 1979, the term “materials”
disappeared from the title of the call, which became “physics and chemistry of condensed
matter” in 1978 and “physico-chemistry of condensed systems” in 1979, both with a budget
of FF 2.5 million.
Materials science only appeared as an explicit objective in 1980, when three CNRS
departments jointly launched a call for tenders: “mathematics and physics”, “chemistry” and
“engineering sciences”. This call targeted four different research areas: i) “Materials with
peculiar physical and chemical properties” (organic solids, composites and amorphous
materials, thin films…); ii) “Plasticity of solid materials” (deformations, defects, cracks,
failures…); iii) “Sintering of metallic powders and ceramics”; iv) “Physico-chemistry of
surfaces and interfaces”. The funding of FF 6.6 million (about 2.5 million EUR) came both
from the CNRS (FF 3.1 million) and the DGRST (FF 3.5 million).5 This suggests a real
convergence of efforts to promote materials science, at least on the academic stage. Looking
at the location of the laboratories funded by this call in 1980, one can make out a kind of map
of materials research in France in 1980, which reveals a homogeneous distribution all over the
French territory.6 But the call fell short on its objective to promote interdisciplinarity, since
only 3 of the 33 funded projects involved both a physics and a chemistry laboratory. In
addition, it is important to note that the French research effort on materials did not solely
come from this ATP scheme. Chemistry remained a disciplinary niche for initiatives on “fine
chemistry” with a total budget of FF 4.5 million, which included a theme centred around the
“synthesis of original materials” for FF 1.5 million.
1.4. A French Exception?
                                                 
5 The 1981 “materials science” call for tenders, financed with FF 4.3 million from the CNRS and FF 3 million
from the DGRST, was also focused on “random macroscopic media” (or “MIAM” for Milieux aléatoires
macroscopiques).
6 22 laboratories from the Paris area, 3 from Lyon, Marseille, Strasbourg, Poitiers, Caen and Montpellier, and 2
from Lille, Grenoble, Nancy, Bordeaux and Toulouse.
6Thus, the earliest French initiative dedicated to materials research was born almost
twenty years after the American initiative launched by the Advanced research projects agency
(ARPA). Does it mean that France was lagging behind the USA?
In the USA, the academic interdisciplinary entity referred to as Materials Science and
Engineering (MSE) was first inspired by the national space and military programs, and later
stimulated by commercial competition (Bensaude-Vincent 2001). In the early 1960s, the
federal government created MSE departments in a number of universities, based around
laboratories equipped with some state-of-the-art instrumentation meant to encourage
collaborations between researchers from physics, chemistry and engineering departments.
This instrument-driven “interdisciplinary discipline” was fully described in a 1975 report by
the National Academy of Sciences.7 MSE was characterized by three associations: i) It
coupled scientific research with engineering application of the end-product; ii) It drew
together different fields of science and engineering: Metals, ceramics, electrical engineering,
chemical engineering, physics, inorganic chemistry, organic chemistry, crystallography, etc;
iii) It required collaboration between different kinds of agents: industrial corporations,
governmental agencies, and universities.
In the early 1980s, as France was about to launch its own national initiative, MSE
underwent two major changes in the USA. First, the Bayh-Dole Act, passed by the US
Congress in 1980, allowed any result arising out of federally funded research to be patented.
The Act successfully redirected academic work toward the generation of intellectual property,
and R&D for consumer markets. At the same time, processing rose to greater prominence
within MSE, thus reinforcing the alliance between science and engineering.
In France, by contrast, materials mainly remained within physics and chemistry, and
prompted interactions between these two communities only. Materials research was not
promoted as a new discipline bringing together science and engineering. Rather, it was an
academic initiative based on existing scientific communities, and under the guidance of the
CNRS, with occasional connections with industrial corporations, and no real concern for
commercial applications. To what extent would the governmental initiative launched in 1982
change the situation?
2. The National Initiative (1982)
2.1. The Political Turn
In 1981, the presidential elections brought about a socialist leader, François Mitterrand.
His new minister for research and technology, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, organized a national
consultation (“Assises régionales de la recherche”), before reforming the French system of
research in the midst of great hopes and enthusiasm. This process resulted in an Act of
Parliament (“Loi d’orientation et de programmation”, July 15, 1982) programming research
and development, which had been declared a “national priority”. The new government’s
policy was clearly set out in the Act: One of its major objectives was to strengthen the links
between academia and industrial firms. In parallel, a large part of the research budget was
devoted to the nation’s industrial development, and to its economic competitiveness.
Remarkably, these orientations also translated into a name change, for Jean-Pierre
Chevènement’s ministry became “ministry of research and industry” on June 29, 1982.
                                                 
7 National Academy of Sciences (1975), Vol. I, Chap. 1. The same report defined MSE: “Materials science and
engineering is concerned with the generation and application of knowledge relating to composition, structure,
and processing of materials to their properties and uses” (Vol. I, Chap. 2, p. 2).
7The links between public research and industry were immediately facilitated by another
law of February 1982, which nationalized large industrial corporations. Most of them were
linked to materials: Thomson-CSF to materials for electronics; Saint-Gobain to glass and
innovative materials (ceramics, crystals, plastics); Rhône-Poulenc to polymers; Pechiney to
aluminium; CGE (renamed Alcatel-Alsthom in 1991) to telecommunication and railroad
materials; Usinor and Sacilor (which merged in 1986) to iron, cast iron and steel.
At the same time, the proportion of R&D in the NGP raised above 2%. As Pierre Papon
was appointed director of the CNRS in September 1982, the budget of the CNRS increased by
25%. Although the majority of the CNRS’ budget was devoted to paying the wages of
researchers (who became permanent civil servants), the budget devoted to interdisciplinary
programs was maintained.
2.2. A Pragmatic View
In 1982, Chevènement commissioned a report on materials research in France from
Jean-Pierre Causse. A physicist, trained at the École normale supérieure, Causse had worked
for Schlumberger in the USA from 1954 to 1962. In 1981, he was at the head of Saint-Gobain
research. Causse thus embodied the alliance between the socialist government and industrial
milieus, which was meant to bring about a radical change to materials research.
The panel in charge of the report included few members, none from universities, and
most from large state agencies dedicated to applied research.8 The panel completed its report
in three months. There was no time, or no inclination to travel abroad, for example to see how
MSE was implemented in other industrial countries. The report subsequently never mentioned
the US as a model.
The report pinpointed two strong points: glass and aluminium, and deplored the lack of
interdisciplinarity, of young researchers and of connections between academic research and
industry. This latter weakness is illustrated by the case of liquid crystals, a domain in which
France failed to develop an industry, even though it was at the forefront of academic
research.9
The concept of materials promoted by Causse’s mission deeply differed from the notion
that prevailed in academic research. Whereas before, the focus had been on structure-
properties relations, in Causse’s report, the users’ perspective prevailed.10 Materials were
approached according to their domains of application, and, from the outset, the ambition of
covering all domains was abandoned. A few sectors were selected as priorities: materials for
electronics, for construction, and for mechanical structures.
The report clearly aimed to bring together science and engineering: The study of
structure/properties was to be complemented by research on design and fabrication processes,
as well as on materials resistance and ageing. Process had to become an integral part of
materials research, thus requiring a dialogue between industry and academics. Even though
Causse’s report was not inspired by the American model, it encouraged a similar “materials
                                                 
8 Jacques Balazard was the technical director of the Aérospatiale, Jérôme Bédier was in charge of the rubber and
plastic division at the Ministry of industry, Guy Bessonnat belonged to a research agency of the army (DRET),
Jacques Boileau to the national explosives manufacture (SNPE), Jean Hanus came from the CNRS, Jean
Jerphagnon from the CNET (national center for research on telecommunications), Gilles Pomey from the
materials department of the École des mines de Paris, and Pierre-François Gobin, rapporteur of the commission,
from the materials department of the Ministry of research and technology.
9 J.P. Causse, interview with B. Bensaude-Vincent, Mar. 31, 2009. All quotations of French speakers are our
translations.
10 “Les Matériaux. Synthèse des propositions du rapport remis à M. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, ministre de la
recherche et de l’industrie”, Sep. 1982, CNRS archives 010035-15. This synthesis adopted a conventional
definition of materials as “a set of solids (or fluids) for the design of objects used by man” (p. 1).
8way of thinking” from structure to properties to process and performance, in complete
contrast to the previously prevailing linear model.11
The report balanced the interests of academic and industrial actors with strong
statements such as: “[Materials research] should anticipate industrial needs, but be
disconnected enough to ensure continuous and rather independent advances based on its own
dynamics”.12 However, the four major objectives assigned to materials research clearly show
the prevalence of industrial and social concerns: i) To decrease the vulnerability of France
with respect to energy and raw materials supply; ii) to keep a commercial balance between
imports and exports; iii) to create permanent jobs; iv) to secure the success of future
technological programs.
The report recommended promoting high-level materials science research, and selecting
a few priorities for specific R&D efforts. Two major concerns guided these recommendations.
Firstly, to avoid subverting existing scientific and industrial networks, the programme
deliberately adopted a pragmatic approach devoid of revolutionary claims. Secondly, it tried
to avoid dispersing funds between too many topics, and concentrated the research effort on a
few national priorities, which could place France in a leading position on the international
market.
The report accordingly recommended a state budget of one billion FF over three years
(1983-85), including 700 millions to be allocated to research priorities, while the remaining
300 million served to maintain research on pre-existing topics. The resulting selection of
priorities suggests a tentative compromise between an industrial logic (leading to a sectoral
approach to materials) and a scientific approach, more concerned with general laws applicable
to all species of materials.
Such type of compromise is not a specific feature of the French strategy. A quick glance
at the annual meetings organized by the American Materials Research Society (MRS),
founded in 1973, reveals similar negotiations between conflicting logics. Despite choosing
generic themes aimed to develop trans-material concepts and foster the unity of MSE,
thematic meetings were gradually replaced by simultaneous sectoral symposia which
increased the number of participants and contributed to the success of the annual meetings
(Roy 1993). Thus, the compromise between specific and generic perspectives on materials is
by no means typically French. Instead, it seems to be a major feature of the entire field of
materials research.
3. The PIRMAT (1982-1994)
3.1. Institutional Implementation
How did the recommendations from Causse’s report actually translate into practice?
Firstly, because the report recommended taking into account existing research groups, the
creation of a big “materials centre” was discarded in favour of an incentive programme
“fostering, coordinating and promoting fundamental research which could contribute to
solving materials problems within the CNRS and associate laboratories.”13
Who would manage the programme named PIRMAT? Since Causse’s panel had no
executive power, this crucial decision laid in the hands of the CNRS. Robert Chabbal, a
                                                 
11 In the 1980s, US MSE courses and textbooks recommended a specific method for designing materials, based
on four parameters: structure, properties, performances and processes. Changes made in any of the four
parameters could impact on the balance of the whole system and require a re-thinking of the whole device.
12 “Les Matériaux. Synthèse...” op. cit., p. 3.
13 “CNRS - Schéma directeur du PIRMAT 1982”, CNRS archives 000029-31, p. 2.
9physicist, and former general director of the CNRS (1976-1979), was designated to
implement the panel’s recommendations.
PIRMAT was a joint production of three CNRS departments: Mathematics and basic
physics, chemistry, and engineering sciences. The scientific board of PIRMAT included four
members from each CNRS department, plus one member from the National institute for
nuclear and particle physics (IN2P3), twelve representatives from the industry, one
representative from the ministry of research and technology, and one from the ministry of
education. The implementation process thus transferred most of the responsibility to the
CNRS, and consequently put much emphasis on fundamental research.
A physicist, Jean Hanus, was chosen to manage PIRMAT. Hanus did a PhD at MIT at
the time when the US interdisciplinary labs were created, between 1959 and 1962, and this
experience may have led him to favour a US model-based policy. He later spent three years at
the Lincoln Laboratory, a military laboratory at the forefront of materials research, between
1966 and 1969. However, when he became an associate member of the CNRS, he quickly
realized that creating a permanent  interdisciplinary structure within the disciplinary
compartments of the CNRS would be impossible. Hanus thus summarized the situation:
“Pierre Papon suggested [the creation of a materials department] but he confronted the
opposition of the community. Physicists despised chemists, mechanics were a world apart. To
study materials, mechanics, physicists and chemists were all like exclusive parents. […] I
knew it was a desperate battle”.14
In a special issue of Le Courrier du CNRS (Sep-Nov 1983), Hanus clearly stated that
PIRMAT’s mission was to act as a bridge between the demands of the industry and the
“spontaneous dynamics of the scientific domain”. To that end, he announced a special effort
on equipment, for the design and characterization of materials, and the creation of
interdisciplinary networks among the 750 researchers working in the field. The PIRMAT
agenda officially included five tasks15: i) To conduct prospective on materials fundamental
research; ii) to launch and support annual incentive actions; iii) to fund “semi-heavy
instrumentation” through partnerships between the CNRS, the ministry of research and
technology, the ministry of education and other state research agencies; iv) to integrate
research on materials design processes; v) to coordinate collaborations at national level
between various partners, including administrations, state research agencies and industry.
In reality, the French materials initiative did not result in an ambitious program. Instead,
PIRMAT became one of the French science establishment’s modest efforts to encourage
interdisciplinary work. Despite its emphasis on the strategic place of materials in increasing
national wealth, and recommendation that big investments should be made, Causse’s report
did not prompt any radical measures. And PIRMAT became a way of re-directing existing
research pathways rather than creating new avenues.
3.2. Epistemic Choices
What definition of materials did the French promoters of materials research have in
mind when they shaped PIRMAT?
A first striking feature is the lack of any homogeneous view or definition of what
materials may be. For Causse, “a material is, above all, the stuff things are made of. Materials
are man-made”.16 This general and abstract definition clearly links materials to human
technology rather than to physical sciences. It reflects the view that the age of “materials by
design” had arrived. In this vision, materials could be shaped according to required specific
                                                 
14 J. Hanus, interview with B. Bensaude-Vincent, May 16, 2007.
15 “Décision de création du PIRMAT”, Mar. 8, 1982, CNRS archives 850180-2.
16 Le Courrier du CNRS, n° 52-53, Sep-Nov 1983, p. 7.
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performances, thus matter should no longer be a limiting factor for technological projects. By
contrast, Jean-Pierre Philibert, a physicist, adopted the standard definition of materials, based
on the relationship between structure and properties, used in physical sciences.17 In this case,
the emphasis was on the multi-scale approach, whereas Jean Rouxel, a chemist and founder of
the Materials centre in Nantes, exclusively focused on the molecular level when reporting his
research on intercalation materials.18
A second striking feature of the French program designed in 1982 is that it presents a
collection of approaches to studying materials, but does not attempt to classify materials
themselves. Rather, it offers an impressionist view of current trends through samples of the
different approaches to materials science. The people in charge of this project were so
convinced of its legitimacy, that they did not feel the need to provide a sound conceptual basis
for a materials program.
The basic assumption underlying PIRMAT was that materials already existed as a
generic entity. The first PIRMAT brochure insisted on “the great unity of the domain when
considering fundamental research, design and control processes. It is this unity of Materials
science and engineering, which makes it possible to coordinate an action at a national scale,
through the implementation of an incentive program and the creation of PIRMAT within the
CNRS”.19 This assumption is also conveyed by the phrase: “le fait matériaux”, which was
coined in describing PIRMAT. It conveys the view that the generic concept encompassing all
materials – from semiconductors and high-tech materials to wood and paper – was a matter of
fact. Given that the unity of materials science was taken for granted, the people in charge of
PIRMAT were not overly concerned by the construction of a generic knowledge, which could
be achieved through using concepts applicable to all types of materials, common methods and
standardised instruments to characterize or measure performances.
Another assumption was that instruments such as electron microscopes, flux neutron
reactors, synchrotrons, and so on, helped make materials science predictive, but that materials
science still lacked theoretical foundations. Such admission could have prompted efforts to
overcome this lacuna. Yet there was no general agreement on the importance of theory. It was
not a priority for Causse, who claimed that: “The role of theory should not be overestimated
in materials science: Theory is established in the relations between the structures and
properties of the products under scrutiny”.20
The brochure “PIRMAT directive scheme 1982” included a visual representation of its
underlying notion of materials, which maintained a clear distinction between science and
engineering, between ideal and real.21 Despite double arrows suggesting interactions, this
chart presents a revised version of the linear model rather than a systems approach:
                                                 
17 Ibid. p. 12: “We shall call ‘materials’ solid bodies (exceptionally, condensed fluids), crystallized or not,
homogeneous or made of more or less complex aggregates. Basic properties of materials deal with ‘structure’, a
term that covers many scales: electronic, atomic, or polyatomic (crystalline aggregates, phases)”.
18 Ibid. p. 18-20.
19 “CNRS - Schéma directeur du PIRMAT 1982”, CNRS archives 000029-31, p. 1.
20 Le Courrier du CNRS, n° 52-53, Sep-Nov 1983, p. 11.
21 “CNRS - Schéma directeur du PIRMAT 1982”, op. cit., p. 3.
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3.3. The Two Lives of PIRMAT
Two periods may easily be distinguished when considering PIRMAT’s brief lifespan: a
period of establishment, in the hands of Hanus, and a period of decline, in the hands of his
successor.
 Once appointed director of PIRMAT, Hanus had to organize a steering committee.
Since he belonged to “mathematics and basic physics” department, he statutorily chose two
co-directors from the two other CNRS departments involved in PIRMAT. He appointed
Annick Percheron-Guégan, a solid-state chemist from the chemistry department, and Joseph
Baixeras, an electronics engineer from the engineering sciences department. Jean-Pierre
Vairon, a polymer chemist, André Zaoui, a mechanical engineer, and Claire Dupas, a
physicist specialized in magnetism, were chosen as the three additional members of the
committee.
The first PIRMAT call for tenders, launched in September 1982, suggests the
prevalence of research on specific types of materials (8 actions), over transversal research
topics (3 actions). The projects selected already departed from the line of Causse’s report:
Nothing on energy and matter saving processes, or materials for housing, materials for
electronics, or wood, which had all been identified as research priorities in the report.22
In 1983, Pierre Papon secured a budget line for PIRMAT, which was independent from
the disciplinary departments, and which increased from one million in 1983 to FF 9 million,
its highest value, in 1986.
In May 1984, a great national conference on materials was jointly organized by the
CNRS and the ministry of research and industry to reinforce the relationship between
academic and industrial researchers. It was considered a success, with one third of the
speakers and over half of the 450 participants coming from industry.23 In April 1985,
                                                 
22 The PIRMAT selection of transversal topics included: plasticity of materials, surfaces and interfaces, and
influence of gravity on the transport properties of fluids in contact with materials.
23 List of participants to the Colloque national matériaux, 1984, CNRS archives 900021-17.
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materials science was officially cited as one of the twenty strategic themes for the CNRS.24 A
second national conference on materials, held in Paris in January 1986, gathered
approximately 600 participants, with a good balance of academia and industry.
However, as an indirect consequence of right-wing parties’ victory in the French
legislative elections, PIRMAT’s flourishing existence suddenly came to halt in March 1986.
In June 1986, Papon was replaced by Serge Feneuille, who was clearly hostile to
interdisciplinary programs, at the head of the CNRS.25 Feneuille decided to integrate
PIRMAT within the disciplinary departments. Thus, PIRMAT became attached to the
department of chemistry. Hanus protested in vain in a letter to Feneuille, on September 10:
“Once attached to the chemistry department, will PIRMAT still speak in the name of the
CNRS, or in the name of the chemistry department? Or, rather, will the chemistry department
speak in the name of the CNRS when materials are concerned? This point is not innocent”.26
The budget of PIRMAT was significantly reduced, due to both a global budget cut at the
CNRS, and the end of the ministry of research’s contribution. In the period 1987-1989,
PIRMAT ceased to have the freedom to select its own incentive actions.
With the comeback of the left in Parliament in 1988, Feneuille was replaced by François
Kourilsky as the head of the CNRS, where he remained until 1994. Kourilsky, a MD and a
biologist, increased the number of interdisciplinary programs and their visibility. However,
PIRMAT never recovered its status. All of its directors resigned: Baixeras in 1988,
Percheron-Guégan in 1989, and Hanus on December 1, 1989. In his resignation letter
addressed to Kourilsky, Hanus wrote: “In the CNRS and in PIRMAT, I have had great joys
and several satisfactions. During the last period, it has been more difficult… Today, it doesn’t
really seem like I am leaving the CNRS, but rather that the CNRS has already left me…”27
This crisis prompted an audit of PIRMAT. Its conclusions were that: i) PIRMAT should
be renewed; ii) It should be placed under the direct management of the CNRS’ director (the
integration of the PIRMAT in the chemistry department was strongly criticized); iii) PIRMAT
should strengthen the links between the CNRS and its industrial partners.28 The expert
committee charged with implementing the audit’s recommendations went even further, and
suggested the creation of a materials science department in the CNRS.
Kourilsky rejected this suggestion. In April 1990, he renewed PIRMAT for four years
and appointed Gérard Beck as its director. Trained both as a chemist and a metallurgist, Beck
had specialized in high-temperature materials for aerospace in Nancy, and developed strong
interactions with industry.29
Beck developed a clear view about the place and purpose of materials research. For
him, “physics or chemistry [were] professions. Materials [was] not a profession”.30 Materials
science was not to be established as a permanent subject in science training and research
organizations. Instead, Beck saw materials science as a temporary affiliation motivated by a
specific target in the course of a chemist’s or a physicist’s career. Beck also emphasized
possible conflicts of interests between materials scientists and industrials: “Innovations
generate conflicts because they destabilize markets” (Beck 1994). While materials scientists
aim to design advanced and innovative materials, industrials are more concerned with
                                                 
24 “Schéma prospectif, 20 thèmes stratégiques pour le CNRS”, Apr. 1985, CNRS archives’ documentary fund, p.
15-17.
25 A. Percheron-Guégan, interview with E. Bertrand, Apr. 1, 2010.
26 Letter from J. Hanus to S. Feneuille, Sep. 10, 1986, CNRS archives 000029-33.
27 J. Hanus, letter to F. Kourilsky, Nov. 14, 1989, CNRS archives 000029-35.
28 “Rapport d’audit sur le PIRMAT”, Jan. 1990, CNRS archives 010035-14.
29 G. Beck, interview with E. Bertrand, Feb. 19, 2010.
30 G. Beck, interview with B. Bensaude-Vincent, Jan. 18, 1996.
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optimizing existing materials, and incremental advances. The result is an accumulation of
“materials on shelves”, i.e. proliferating useless innovations.
This new PIRMAT was part of Kourilsky’s global effort to foster interdisciplinarity at
the CNRS, which included achieving an equal number of scientific departments and
interdisciplinary programs. Based on this engagement in favour of interdisciplinarity, Beck
accepted the direction of the new PIRMAT. He introduced a new acronym, SGM, which
stands for “Science et génie des matériaux”, and was inspired by the English MSE. In front of
the PIRMAT Program committee on September 1990, Beck thus summarized the situation:
“At the end of the 1970s, materials were a matter of fact; The 1980s were characterized by
interdisciplinarity; The 1990s will see unity.” Retrospectively he confesses that it was a
utopia.31
The Beck period of PIRMAT (1990-1994) is characterized by three major features: i) A
regular decrease in financial resources; ii) decentralisation resulting in the establishment of
six inter-regional networks, and centres for materials science scattered over the French
territory; iii) stronger links between PIRMAT and industry. Thanks to a new kind of research
program contract (called Contrat de programme de recherche), industry had to fund at least
half of the research program budget. A national conference called “Materials: science and
industry”, in June 1992, was jointly organized by various ministries and state research
agencies, and celebrated this reinforced alliance. Researchers coming from large French
industrial companies gave all six of the plenary talks.
However, PIRMAT’s destiny had been sealed and come to an end in 1994. No new
incentive action was launched in 1994, and the budget was not even sufficient to honour
PIRMAT’s pre-existing commitments. Yet Beck was asked to implement a replacement
structure. He invented DIMAT (Materials inter-departmental delegation), a structure with no
financial resource, but charged with proposing materials incentive actions to the three relevant
CNRS scientific departments. DIMAT was launched on November 11, 1994, under Beck’s
direction. It had virtually no autonomy and was completely dependent on the scientific
departments. Beck’s official mission was to represent the CNRS in negotiations with industry,
to maintain the visibility of materials research within the CNRS, and to coordinate this
research between CNRS laboratories. This weak residue of an ambitious program was very
short-lived. In Beck’s memory: “It only lasted two or three years. It was just a series of power
conflicts. […] The heads of departments did not want to share their power”.32 Thus 1997 can
be considered the official death date of PIRMAT’s successor.
4. A Failure Story?
How are we to evaluate PIRMAT in terms of its success in promoting materials
research? It is obviously not a success story, and many of the actors we interviewed expressed
mixed and bitter feelings about PIRMAT. Yet it is not a complete failure story.
First, the end of PIRMAT by no means implied that materials research disappeared
from CNRS laboratories. Nowadays, it seems to be conducted in several niches of chemistry
and physics, as was the case before the creation of PIRMAT. Disciplinary affiliations and
research programs on optoelectronics, spintronics, surface science, sol-gel, macromolecular
chemistry, and so on, have all survived the end of PIRMAT. The PIRMAT governmental
initiative was so poorly implemented that it merely created a wave on the surface of a resilient
disciplinary structure, with its own dynamics.
                                                 
31 G. Beck, interview with E. Bertrand, Feb. 19, 2010.
32 Ibid.
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Hence the striking contrast between this short-lived program initiated from the top-
down by science policy, and other long-term research projects built from the bottom-up.
Ironically, the only thematic action which survived PIRMAT - the ATP “MIAM” (for Milieux
aléatoires macroscopiques) - had been started before the creation of PIRMAT (Bideau et al.
2008). MIAM was a bottom-up project, initiated by individual researchers, which lead to
flexible networks, rather than a top-down political initiative creating stable institutions. This
action also instantiated an alternative approach to materials research: It was not an
engineering approach like the US concept of MSE. Instead, it was cognitive research on
macroscopic behaviours of specific heterogeneous disordered materials. It focused on the
relation between geometrical structure and physical properties, rather than on performance or
process.
The story of PIRMAT illustrates the failure of a science policy initiative launched in
1982, but not the failure of materials research in France. In order to identify the weakest links
in the chain of decisions that prompted such failure, we got into more details, and found both
structural and conjectural reasons.
4.1 The Choice of the CNRS
PIRMAT was a victim of CNRS’ hegemony in the second half of the twentieth century.
The traditional role of CNRS heads of departments was to defend the position and budget of
their own discipline, which made them disinclined to promote interdisciplinary research. A
disciplinary-structured agency may not seem like the best choice to conduct an
interdisciplinary program. Yet interdisciplinary labs flourished in US universities, which were
also organized in disciplinary departments.
The choice of the CNRS presented additional shortcomings. Unlike universities, which
enjoyed a margin of academic freedom, the CNRS was extremely dependent on the
government. Although the CNRS was created to promote the autonomy of scientific research,
in reality, its research policy fluctuated according to political changes, and the turnover of its
directors followed national elections. Moreover, being an institute with stable laboratories, the
CNRS lacked flexibility and quick reactivity to implement short-term multi-actor projects.
The US National Science Foundation, for instance, may have been a more appropriate agency
because it provided flexible resources for research. In addition, although they did have
experience in international work and collaborations, the leaders of PIRMAT worked in a
relative isolation.
4.2 Financial Resources
However, funding was the most obvious obstacle to the success of the PIRMAT. There
was a striking contrast between the explicit ambitions of the governmental initiative, and the
limited funds allocated by the CNRS. As Causse bitterly noted, “prospective without funding
is nothing”.33 In 1982, PIRMAT’s total budget was 10.3 million FF, most of it from the
CNRS. Support from the ministry of research was rather weak and dried-up in 1986. Over the
course of its existence, 83 % of PIRMAT’s financial resources came from the CNRS, 13 %
from the ministry of research, and 4 % from other sources, mostly from the Paris region (Ile-
de-France). The recently nationalized industries of the 1980s failed to massively invest in
PIRMAT and remained in its margins.
Moreover, the government’s financial effort did not last long. Chart 1 below shows that
the budget raised from 1982 to 1985, when its total budget peaked at 26.7 million 1990 FF
                                                 
33 J-.P. Causse, interview with B. Bensaude-Vincent, Mar. 31, 2009.
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equivalent.34 It remained constant and close to its 1984 level from 1986 to 1989, at
approximately 17 M 1990FF. The noticeable exception was the year 1988, when CNRS
departments allocated important funds to PIRMAT, exclusively dedicated to high-temperature
superconductors research. From 1989 to 1994, financial resources regularly decreased.
Year Total Budget
(Real MFF)
Total Budget
(M 1990FF)
CNRS
contribution
(M 1990FF)
Ministry of
research
contribution
(M 1990FF)
Other
contributions
(M 1990FF)
1982 10.3 14.9 8.7 6.2 0
1983 12.4 16.4 9.9 6.2 0.3
1984 15.1 18.6 12.1 6.5 0
1985 22.9 26.7 17.5 9.2 0
1986 14.5 16.4 16.4 0 0
1987 16.4 18 18 0 0
1988 24.3 26 20.9 0 5.1
1989 17.2 17.8 14.8 0 3
1990 14.3 14.3 14.3 0 0
1991 15.7 15.2 15.2 0 0
1992 14.1 13.4 13.4 0 0
1993 12.4 11.5 11.5 0 0
1994 7 6.4 6.4 0 0
Total 82-94 196.6 215.6 179.1 28.1 8.4
Chart 1: Total budget of PIRMAT between 1982 and 1994, in Million French Francs
(MFF) of the considered year (“real MFF”) and in MFF of 1990 equivalent, corrected for
inflation (“M 1990FF”).
Chart 2 shows that 80.5 % of the CNRS contribution came from three departments
(Maths and basics physics, Chemistry and Engineering sciences), whilst only 14.5 % came
from its dedicated budget (cancelled in 1986). Thus, PIRMAT had to live off the resources of
the three disciplinary departments: 40.5 % from chemistry, 38.5 % from physics, and 21 %
from engineering sciences. From 1982 to 1988, the physics department was the largest
contributor, whereas from 1989 to 1994, it was the chemistry department.
                                                 
34 In order to make comparisons between different years without being misled by the effects of inflation, we
chose to convert all the figures into French Francs of 1990. We thus distinguish between million of real French
Francs (“real MFF”) and million of French Francs of 1990 (“M 1990FF”).
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Scientific departmentsYears PIRMAT
dedicated
budget line
(M 1990FF)
Mathematics
and basic
physics
(M 1990FF)
Chemistry
(M 1990FF)
Engineering
sciences
(M 1990FF)
Others
(M 1990FF)
1982 0 5.0 2.3 0.5 0.9
1983 1.3 4.4 2.2 1.1 0.9
1984 4.6 3.2 2.5 1.8 0
1985 10.0 2.8 2.1 2.1 0.5
1986 10.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 0
1987 0 4.9 6.3 3.6 3.2
1988 0 9.0 7.9 3.6 0.4
1989 0 4.4 6.7 3.4 0.3
1990 0 5.0 6.5 2.5 0.3
1991 0 4.1 6.1 3.0 2.0
1992 0 4.0 6.0 3.4 0
1993 0 3.6 5.3 2.4 0.2
1994 0 2.8 2.3 1.3 0
Total 82-94 26 55.5 58.2 30.7 8.7
Chart 2: Origin of the CNRS budget for PIRMAT (in M 1990FF).
However, a comparison of PIRMAT’s average annual budget with the typical annual
budget of a CNRS department shows that PIRMAT never got a budget of the same order of
magnitude. For instance, the mean annual budget of the chemistry department (excluding
salaries and basic support) was approximately seven times more than PIRMAT’s budget.
Nevertheless, over its brief existence, PIRMAT did bring about a number of changes,
which call for a closer look.
4.3. Dispersion
The two main criticisms addressed to PIRMAT by the audit report of January 1990
were an excessive dependence on CNRS departments, and too little collaboration with
industry.35
Industrial partnerships gradually increased between 1984 and 1989, but did not prompt
new research pathways. They were simply grafted onto existing CNRS research programs.
A significant part of the PIRMAT budget was spent on instrumentation intended for
creating materials research centres, similar to the US interdisciplinary labs created in the
1960s. However, the equipment policy did not respond to clear priorities and was excessively
dispersed. More generally, in the period 1982-89, 661 actions were undertaken by PIRMAT,
including 87 % with budgets under FF 250 000. Nevertheless, since 161 CNRS laboratories
benefited from PIRMAT actions over that period, virtually all materials research groups
received something from PIRMAT. This may be seen as sowing the seeds of future
enterprises.
During the Beck period (1990-1994), industrial collaborations prevailed in PIRMAT.
About 60 industrial companies were involved in partnerships with CNRS labs. But this policy
was not whole-heartedly approved by the CNRS. During the program committee meeting on
June 17, 1993, a delegate from the National committee deplored this industrial orientation and
                                                 
35 “Rapport d’audit sur le PIRMAT”, Jan. 1990, CNRS archives 010035-14.
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declared the necessity “not to exclusively limit researchers to studies interesting the
industry.”36 Yet the CNRS was the major beneficiary of PIRMAT: 192 CNRS laboratories
benefited from the 409 actions undertaken by PIRMAT. In addition, in December 1993, 350
PhDs on themes supported by PIRMAT were in progress in CNRS laboratories. More
importantly, PIRMAT also favoured the creation of CNRS/industry joint laboratories, which
often outlived PIRMAT.37
Finally, in the last years of its existence, PIRMAT represented a real incentive for its
partners: Whereas the cumulative budget of PIRMAT for 1991-1994 was only of 49 MFF, its
partners, mostly industrial companies, funded CNRS laboratories up to a total amount of 126
MFF. Consequently, between 1991 and 1994, the total funding of the PIRMAT actions was
3.5 times larger (175 MFF) than PIRMAT’s total budget (49 MFF).
4.4. Lack of Independence
While the intensification of industrial partnerships under Beck’s direction addressed one
of the problems mentioned in the audit, the lack of independence remained a more serious
cause for concern. In fact, Beck had no leverage left to follow the roadmap traced by Causse’s
report. When PIRMAT lost its autonomous budget, its two successive directors became
unable to take any action without the consent of CNRS departments. The number of “thematic
programmed actions” (ATP) aimed to encourage physicists, chemists and mechanical
engineers to re-direct their research trajectories dropped. From the 1990s onwards, the
chemistry, physics and SPI departments behaved like PIRMAT “shareholders”.38 Since
between them they held 100 % of the shares, they were all powerful in imposing their views.
In the late 1980s, while the audit committee examined PIRMAT in France, the
American National Research Council published a two-hundred-page report about the
orientation of Materials Science and Engineering (National Research Council 1989). This
report insisted on the need to intensify the national research effort on both the fundamental
and industrial fronts. It recommended an increase of the national budget, and more
interactions between universities and industry. Both recommendations were quite similar to
those of the French audit committee. However, the US report also insisted on the necessity to
reinforce the unity of materials science.
This is seen as a major difference with the French research style, at least by the actors of
materials research in France. Friedel contrasted the American and French cases in those
terms:
“A materials dynamics developed in the US as a result of a lack of big university
research institutes distinct from nuclear, high-energy physics, or space research
laboratories, all equipped with big instruments. The situation was about the same
in the UK (apart from a few centres such as Cambridge, Oxford, Bristol...). The
situation was radically different in Germany (with the Max Planck institutes), and
in France with the CNRS”.39
This opinion reverses the usual perspective: Success is attributed to negative causes
(lack of academic research agencies), while failure would be due to an excess of research
                                                 
36 Report of the PIRMAT program committee meeting of June 17, 1993, CNRS archives 010035-14.
37 For instance, the CNRS/Saint-Gobain joint laboratory, created in January 1990.
38 The term “shareholder” came in use in Dec. 1, 1993, when one of the department directors complained that the
1994 budget did not “respect the shareholding originally decided for the program (physics 30 %, engineering
sciences 25 %, chemistry 45 %)”. Report of the PIRMAT steering committee meeting of Dec. 1, 1993, CNRS
archives 010035-14.
39 J. Friedel, personal communication to B. Bensaude-Vincent, Nov. 18, 2001.
18
agencies. This account may be an antidote to the prevailing tendency to view the US as the
centre of scientific innovation, which provides a model to other countries. However, it may
also reveal a strong national bias. Our interviews of CNRS materials scientists suggested a
general tendency among French scientists to emphasize the positive role of the CNRS and to
reject the US model.
By contrast, the leaders of the French program were more critical. In 1990, the panel
chaired by Causse was still an active working group, which wrote annual reports on the state
of the art, but was never consulted by the CNRS. In 1990, the panel replaced the routine
exercise by a broader assessment of what had been achieved since 1982. This critical self-
evaluation acknowledged a number of prospective “errors”.40 In fact, this list of “errors”
became an excuse to stop the annual exercise of review and recommendations, and served to
dilute more radical criticisms directly questioning the consistency of the French science
policy. Causse’s disappointment was explicited in a personal letter he addressed to Hubert
Curien, the then Minister of research and technology, together with its report.
He complained about decreasing budgets, emphasizing that the financial plan for 1991
was back to the level of the 1984 budget. And he bitterly concluded: “The project of a great
incentive program launched by the 1982 report seems to have been forgotten by now; in fact it
has never been applied.”41
His second target was the CNRS: “The difficulty in dealing with interdisciplinary
programs is apparent in the agencies. It is obvious that PIRMAT never got the means needed
to implement the CNRS’ materials policy”.
A third criticism concerned the dispersion of too many under-sized local programs, and
lack of national coordination: “In the absence of a real, clearly formulated and effectively
managed national program, many of these initiatives lead to a regrettable mess.
Regionalization enhanced the disorder. There, again, should be a firmly-established national
policy…”
Retrospectively, Causse sees two major reasons for PIRMAT’s modest achievements:
No funding and no political support.42 In his view, materials were a top priority only for
Chevènement, who had a broad vision and was prepared to invest a substantial amount of
money over a long term, in order to “fill the gaps”. But none of his successors at the ministry
of research and industry shared his enthusiasm, and they simply considered this program a
routine source of funding for daily research.
Neither Causse nor Hanus mentioned the responsibility of industrial companies. Hanus
just mentioned in passing that “in the contracts with industry, the CNRS did not always ask
for the final report, and was thus able to retain 10% of the budget. Industry did not deliver its
share of the work; That was no secret”.43 Hanus deplored the attitude of CNRS researchers
towards industry. They were reluctant to admit an industrial coordination of the program, as
had been recommended by Jean-Louis Beffa, the executive director of Saint-Gobain and an
influential member of the CNRS’ National committee. Hanus saw this as a missed
opportunity for the CNRS: “This [industrial coordination of PIRMAT] might have helped the
overall action of the CNRS. But we faced strong opposition: On the one hand, it was out of
the question that the ‘great capital’ should take hold of our ‘grey matter’; On the other hand,
                                                 
40 Their errors of prospective were: the priority to “all-ceramics engine” which never worked, while overlooking
the increase of ceramics in housing equipments. In electronics, they had invested in As-Ga semi-conductors,
which had no industrial future. Like most people around the world they had not predicted high-temperature
superconductivity, and too much money had been invested in the race after the Nobel Prize, in 1986.
41 J-.P. Causse, letter to H. Curien, minister of research and technology, Mar. 5, 1991.
42 J-.P. Causse, interview with B. Bensaude-Vincent, Mar. 31, 2009.
43 J. Hanus, interview with B. Bensaude-Vincent, May 16, 2007.
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there was little mobility among French CNRS researchers, who lacked a broad vision on
things.”44
However, Hanus and his collaborators also mentioned more positive aspects of the
program. First, Marie-Claude Vitorge, a researcher who worked for PIRMAT from 1985 to
1989, remembered the exceptional atmosphere created by PIRMAT, with its friendly
partnerships and a strict selection process for ATP, which discouraged lobbying. Hanus
mentioned significant cooperative results: For instance, some scientific advances on high-
temperature materials, or innovations in ceramics for nuclear industry from R&D conducted
by the CEA, their characterization by university or CNRS groups, and synthesis by the
COGEMA (Compagnie générale des matières nucléaires). He also mentioned R&D on quasi-
crystals, in Vitry, and the creation of a few CNRS/industry joint laboratories…But his effort
to remember was interrupted by increasing doubt: Were all these positive aspects really a
consequence of PIRMAT?
On March 31, 1992, a year after the working group chaired by Causse delivered its
assessment report, the minister Curien officially dissolved the group. In its place, he created
two inter-ministerial structures on July 28, 1992: A Council for orientation of materials
(COMAT) and an Inter-ministerial group on materials (GIM). The COMAT was tasked with
making recommendations for the national policy on materials science, development and
technology. But none of these commissions were able to prevent the death of PIRMAT in
1994.
Conclusion
PIRMAT’s destiny exemplifies a number of salient features of the French style in
Materials research. First, in stark contrast to the USA and other industrial countries, there was
no “materials boom” in France. On the one hand, modest funding and difficulties with the
implementation of interdisciplinary structures and academia/industry partnerships are hardly
specific to France. On the other hand, the French initiative suffered from the gap between a
strong official political will to make materials a top priority in 1982, and a very modest
corresponding CNRS budget. It later suffered from political changes and from a high turnover
of ministers and CNRS directors. In addition, as a state-funded research agency, the CNRS
secured a large autonomy for permanent researchers, and a lack of pressure to raise funds
from industry or private foundations.
These structural and conjectural reasons account for the modest results of PIRMAT.
However, from the failure of this interdisciplinary program, we should not conclude to the
failure of materials research in France. Most of materials research has been conducted in
disciplinary laboratories. CNRS researchers had their own concept of materials research,
which did not correspond to the close association between science and engineering advocated
in Causse’s report. The report itself made an ambiguous proposal in seeking to promote a new
style of research within existing structures. The engineering approach never prevailed in
France. To this day, French materials research has retained an academic disciplinary profile.
How are we to interpret those features? There is no such thing as an anti-materials
“French spirit” contrasting with a pro-materials “Americano-British spirit”. For those who
believe that R&D policy should be shaped by competition and national rankings, PIRMAT’s
failure can be seen as the symptom of an intrinsic weakness of the French system.
Alternatively, we suggest considering such features as parts of a cultural style shaped by
national institutions and traditions, in particular the technophilic inclinations of socialism in
France. Hopefully, this biography of PIRMAT, attention to local constraints and
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circumstances, and a multicultural view of scientific endeavour, may all go some way towards
helping plan future national initiatives.
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